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IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN: THE JUDICIAL VIEW OF
GOVERNMENT TAKINGS OF PRIVATE WETLANDS
I am the Lorax, I speak for the trees. I speakfor the trees, for the trees
have no tongues.
Dr. Seuss
In the make-believe world of Dr. Seuss, the Lorax warned against the
destruction of the environment. Unfortunately, the basis of the warning
can be found in today's real world. As this nation becomes more aware
of the fragility of its environment, there will be growing conflicts between
the different interests that concern us as a society.' People today are
beginning to realize that commonly held values need to be reevaluated in
light of new and emerging concerns and that the danger to the environ-
ment is no longer something that can be ignored. One such issue is that
of wetlands2 protection.
As the government seeks to protect this nation's wetlands, private
owners of those lands demand compensation for loss of the economic
viability of those lands. The conflict is simply a question of whether the
government action is a valid exercise of police power or whether it is an
impermissible interference with the enjoyment of private property
rights.3 The answer is far from clear. On the one hand, there is an inher-
ent sense of fairness that would seem to dictate compensation for eco-
nomic loss caused by government regulation.4 On the other hand, there
is a strong argument that the government must not be hindered in its
ability to protect the wetlands.'
This Note discusses the problems that arise in the creation of a judicial
standard to resolve this conflict. Part I examines the history of the wet-
lands and the origin of the primary federal legislation created to protect
them. Part II discusses the current judicial trends in deciding whether
1. It is really within the last 30 years that public awareness has grown to be more
sensitive to environmental issues. The result has been an increase of legislation aimed at
our environment. Recent legislation included standards for maintaining clean air and
water, restrictions on the dumping of wastes and the establishment of liability for individ-
uals responsible for the contamination of land or water. For a broad overview of the
types of legislation that have been enacted, see Sweeney, Protection of the Environment in
the United States, 1 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 3 (1989).
2. "Wetlands possess three essential characteristics: (1) hydrophytic vegetation,
(2) hydric soils, and (3) wetland hydrology, which is the driving force creating all wet-
lands. The three technical criteria specified are mandatory and must all be met for an
area to be identified as wetland. Therefore, areas that meet these criteria are wetlands."
FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WET-
LANDS, 5 (An Interagency Cooperative Publication) Fish and Wildlife Service, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Department of the Army, January 1989.
3. See, e.g., Nat'l L. J., July 23, 1990, at 24.
4. See, e.g., Siemon, Of Regulatory Takings and Other Myths, 1 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 105, 105 (1985).
5. Tripp & Hertz, Wetland Preservation and Restoration: Changing Federal Priori-
ties, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCE L. 221, 223 (1988).
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wetlands regulations constitute a taking. Finally, Part III points out the
different paths that are open to the judiciary to follow in resolving the
issue. This Note concludes by arguing that the courts must look beyond
economic considerations as the single determinant in deciding whether
compensation must be given. Rather, courts should expand their view to
include an ecological perspective.
I. REGULATION OF WETLANDS
There is no question that we have seriously depleted our wetlands in
the United States. Well over half the wetlands in this country have been
destroyed.6 In the time between the first settlements on this continent
and the 1980's, approximately 215 million acres of wetlands have been
reduced to 95 million.7
This unrestrained destruction resulted from a lack of understanding of
the wetlands' importance. When settlers first came to this country, they
saw wetlands as unprofitable land to which no good use could be made.
As both our technology and population grew, it became apparent that
these wetlands tracts would be profitable if they were developed and
sold.8 The policy of developing the wetlands has resulted in a staggering
amount of destruction to them in the latter part of this century. 9
Only recently has the rapid disappearance of the wetlands begun to
alarm people. As the importance of the role wetlands play in our chain
of ecology as well as in our economic projections became more apparent,
calls for curtailing their continuing destruction became more vocal. 10
Wetlands perform many extremely important functions including the
prevention of flooding, the maintenance of ground water supplies and the
provision of fish and wildlife habitats." Through these functions, "wet-
lands furnish spawning and nursery areas for commercial and sport fish-
ing, act as natural cleaners of airborne and waterborne pollutants,
provide recharge areas for water supplies, afford natural protection from
hazardous floods .... and serve as high yield food sources for aquatic
animals."' 2 It could be argued that any one of these functions would
6. Id. at 221.
7. Id.
8. Klock & Cook, The Condemning of America: Regulatory "Takings" and the
Purchase By the United States of America's Wetlands, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 330, 331
(1988).
9. In the 20 year period from the mid 1950's to the mid 1970's the annual loss rate of
the lower 48 states alone was 458,000 acres. See supra note 5, at 221.
10. See generally Lovely, Protecting Wetlands: Consideration of Secondary Social and
Economic Effects by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in its Wetlands Permitting
Process, 17 ENVTL. AFF. 647 (1990); Klock & Cook, supra note 8, at 332; Smallwood,
Alderman & Dix, The Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984: A Primer,
1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 211, 211 (1985) and Comment, Wetland Litigation in the
Gulf Coast States, 58 Miss. L.J. 123, 123-24 (1988).
11. Tripp & Hertz, supra note 5, at 221-22.
12. Blumm, Wetlands Protection and Coastal Planning: A voiding the Perils of Positive
Consistency, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 69, 69-70 (1978).
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warrant strong regulation.13 Taken as a whole, it cannot be disputed that
preservation of wetlands is one of our society's most important goals.
They play far more than merely an aesthetic role in our ecosystem; they
are vital to maintaining a healthy and stable ecology. 4
In response to the alarming disintegration of the ecologically sensitive
land, Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA).15 Section 404 of the
CWA makes unlawful the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
waters of the United States as well as removal of materials without a
permit issued from the Secretary of the Army. 6 The implementation of
the statute is delegated to the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps). 7 The Corps evaluates permit requests to ensure compliance
with Corps and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations.18
The Corps makes determinations as to the granting of the permitting
process in which developers seek to gain fill permits.' 9 Although the
CWA never mentions the term "wetlands," over time both the Corps and
EPA have established regulations which deal with these lands.2" The
13. One problem, documented by many biologists including Paul and Anne Ehrlich,
which has been caused by the destruction of the wetlands is that it endangers the different
species of animals which live there. The problem of species extinction is one of tremen-
dous proportions. Aside from the general notions that the loss of any species is aestheti-
cally and ethically repugnant, there are far reaching effects that are not as apparent.
Different, seemingly insignificant species are helpful in research including, anti-cancer
agents, antibiotics and anti-venoms. Additionally, protecting species is a paramount goal
because of the important contribution that they make in maintaining a healthy environ-
ment. When species are lost, ecosystems are disrupted and, as a result, nature's ability to
provide a moderate climate, cleanse air and water, protect crops, and replenish soil is
destroyed. The wetlands also are important to future generations. Many of the species
which habituate in these lands are essential to gene research. Without protection for
diverse species we face incalculable catastrophe. See Note, Regulated Taking of
Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 406-08
(1988).
14. See generally McCurdy, Public Trust Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683
(1989).
15. The CWA was part of the sweeping amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). The act was passed
in an effort to gain better enforcement of the statutory prohibitions. Note, The Supreme
Court Upholds the Corps' "Wetland Jurisdiction," 2 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 65, 70
(1986).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
18. See infra note 19 and accompanying text..
19. The authorization to issue regulations for the wetland permitting process is found
in section 404 of the CWA. (33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)). The established guidelines are set out
in 403(b). This section establishes the standards for ocean dumping permits. The Corps
is required to consider pollutant disposal effects on aesthetic, recreation and economic
values (§ 1343(c)(i)(C)). The CWA defines pollutants very broadly and includes virtually
any fill material (§ 1362(6)). As a result, the Corps has very broad powers to grant or
deny permits.
20. In delegating authority to the Corps under CWA § 404, Congress defined "navi-
gable waters" as the protected entity. The question of what exactly constituted navigable
waters proved problematic. Although it made no specific designation, Congress clearly
intended to expand protection beyond traditionally navigable waters. The result was to
expand jurisdiction of the Corps over non-adjacent wetlands which affect interstate com-
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Corps' authority was ultimately defined by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Riverside.2 The issue before the Court was whether the Corps
had statutory and constitutional authority to require a permit for filling
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.22
In unanimously reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court held that by
finding the determining factor to be frequent flooding of an area the
lower court had misconstrued the Corps' definition of lands covered
under the CWA. The Supreme Court determined that saturation by
either surface or ground water was sufficient to trigger the Corps' author-
ity as long as the saturation supports wetland vegetation.23 The Court
based its view that the jurisdictional extension was proper on the lan-
guage, policies and legislative history of the CWA.24 Despite the fact
that wetlands are not specifically mentioned in the CWA, the Riverside
opinion makes the Corps' authority to regulate permits over the wetlands
clear. Riverside left open the possibility of government regulation
amounting to a taking, but did not clearly define such circumstances.25
While the Court noted that the claimants here might have a ripe taking
claim, that issue was not before the Court.26 The possibility mentioned
by the Court presents an opening for additional takings claims for other
plaintiffs.
Congress realized the importance of the wetlands when it enacted the
CWA amendment.27 The Riverside opinion settled any confusion as to
the Corps' jurisdiction to regulate wetlands under the statute. Now that
the smoke has cleared on the Corps' ability to grant permits, a new prob-
lem has appeared on the horizon: to what extent does the Corps' denial
of a permit constitute a regulatory taking? To fully analyze this issue it is
necessary to examine the evolution of the takings doctrine.
merce. Since most wetlands are home to fish and migratory birds, interstate commerce
(e.g., the fishing industry) is easily affected by the vast majority of wetlands. This expan-
sion of jurisdiction was met with much resistance until the Supreme Court finally laid the
issue to rest. See infra note 21 and accompanying text. For an in-depth look at the expan-
sion of the Corps' jurisdiction, see Geltman, Regulation of Non-Adjacent Wetlands Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 615 (1988-89).
21. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
22. Id. at 123.
23. Id. at 129.
24. Id. at 132-35.
25. Id. at 128.
26. Id. at 129 n.6.
27. The congressional intent of the FWPCA can be seen when considering the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982 & Supp. V
1987). It is this regulation which set the statutory framework for the more specific
FWPCA. Congress enacted NEPA to ensure that governmental agencies consider envi-
ronmental factors whenever a proposed federal action could significantly affect the
human environment. Written broadly, NEPA sets no substantive standards. Rather,
NEPA is designed to ensure that humans and nature coexist in productive harmony,
while promoting fulfillment of human social and economic requirements both now and in
the future. Lovely, Protecting Wetlands: Consideration of Secondary Social and Eco-
nomic Effects by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in its Wetlands Permitting
Process, 17 ENVTL. AFF. 647, 651 (1990).
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II. THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE
The fifth amendment of the Constitution provides for compensation to
be given when government takes private land for public use.28 While a
seemingly simple concept, the application of takings law has been ex-
tremely confusing.2 9 The creation of a definitive standard is very diffi-
cult. One hotly debated issue is the question of when an exercise of the
police power of government 30 so infringes on individual property rights
that it makes the regulation invalid, requiring that compensation must be
paid.31 One way the judiciary strikes this balance is through employing
an economic theory. 32 This approach is generally used by the Supreme
Court in deciding takings cases. 33 It is necessary to explain the economic
theory to some extent.
While there is no doubt that the government may establish restrictions
regarding land use, at some point those regulations may become so inhib-
itive that they will constitute a taking of the property by the govern-
ment.34 The Supreme Court has held that land use regulation may
amount to a taking if the regulation does not advance a legitimate state
interest or denies an owner economically viable use of their land.3" As
28. U.S. CONST. amend V., states in pertinent part: "nor shall property be taken for
public use without just compensation."
29. In fact, commentators have noted, "[t]he incoherence of takings law is legend."
Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a
Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 433, 434 (1989). The Court has been
attacked for creating "chaos" and displaying a "sorry performance" in its land use tak-
ings cases, creating "a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results." Bowden
& Feldman, Take It or Leave It: Uncertain Regulatory Taking Standards and Remedies
Threaten California's Open Space Planning, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (1981); Epstein,
Not Deference but Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351, 353;
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964).
30. In making a determination of justifiable police power the judiciary is often very
deferential to the legislature. A measure that is designed to protect health, welfare and
safety often need only be reasonable. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (the definition of reasonableness
depends on the balance between what needs to be protected against and the means by
which the government chooses to protect). When reasonableness is challenged, it is gen-
erally incumbent on the challenger to prove unreasonableness. See, e.g., Goldblatt, 369
U.S. at 596; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959).
31. The general idea of just compensation is beyond the scope of this Note. For an
overview, see generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1977); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974);
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
32. An economic approach is a determination of whether the economic value of the
land will become so eviscerated that the land owner has been left with valueless property.
Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Pub-
lic's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 342
(1988).
33. The basis of a regulatory taking economic theory stems from Justice Holmes'
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In that case, the
Supreme Court first recognized that a restrictive zoning and land-use regulation that
"goes too far" can constitute a taking if it takes away the value of the land. Id. at 415.
34. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
35. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The first part of the test is
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noted in Pennsylvania Coal,36 a takings determination is "a question of
degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general proposition."37
The degree mentioned by Justice Holmes deals with the infringement on
the profit value of the land by the government regulation. The Court has
utilized several factors in making this economic determination. These
factors have been articulated in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. ,38 where the Court observed, "we have identified three factors
which have particular significance: (1) the economic impact of the regu-
lation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations; (3) the character of
the government action."39 In making a determination of a taking, the
dominant factor that is relied on by the Court is how much profit will be
lost for the owner of the property."°
Given the substantial sums of money real estate investors stand to
make by developing wetlands, the amount of interest in takings cases
concerning wetlands is not surprising.4" If investors are not able to get
the value they expect for the land as a result of government regulations,
they will most likely seek to get compensation from the government.
The relevant inquiry has been whether all possible alternative uses for
the land have been foreclosed.42 In Agins v. City of Tiburon,4 3 the claim-
ants held an unimproved five acre tract of land. The city adopted an
ordinance which restricted development on the claimants land to a one
a due process inquiry to determine the legitimacy of the regulation itself. The second
part, dealing with economics, determines the loss of profit viability to the owner of the
land. Thus, under this test, if the regulation is valid on its face, the determination of the
compensation issue rests upon the economics of the regulation.
36. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
37. Id. at 413.
38. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
39. Id. at 224. In looking at the investment-backed expectation factor, the Court has
traditionally stated that the expectation must be reasonable. Thus, a land owner cannot
pick any amount of profit, but must be prepared to demonstrate the likelihood of ob-
taining that amount or near that amount. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
40. There are some examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has not used eco-
nomics as the primary factor. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). In this
case, a prohibition on the sale of eagles or their parts rendered commercially valueless the
plaintiff's eagle feathers. The Court nonetheless upheld the regulation stating that: "[a]t
any rate, loss of future profits - unaccompanied by any physical property restriction -
provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." Id. at 66. For other exam-
ples of a non-economic approach, see infra, notes 106-12. It is important to note that in
Andrus, the Court qualified its statement implying that there was a greater interest in lost
profits when a regulation contains a physical property restriction. That would be the case
concerning a permit denial under § 404. It has been further noted that these cases repre-
sent the exception to the rule and "are not widely followed." See Hunter, supra note 32,
at 331.
41. Hunter, supra note 32, at 342.
42. See id. at 262-63; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
136-37, reh'g denied 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
43. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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family dwelling, accessory buildings and open-space uses." The
Supreme Court has stated that a fifth amendment takings claim does not
exist when other uses of the land are permitted despite the regulation.45
The Court wrote that "although the ordinances limit development, they
neither prevent the best use of the land, nor extinguish a fundamental
attribute of ownership."' 6 The issue becomes what constitutes the "best
use" of the land. This decision is important because an applicant's asser-
tion of a takings claim may not be valid if it is only the highest yielding
plan for the land that is foreclosed by the regulation. Owners will un-
doubtably argue that the best use is being denied and therefore the regu-
lation constitutes a taking. Thus, if a permit is denied for the filling of a
wetlands parcel, this standard for takings applies if the economic viabil-
ity is removed by virtue of the denial. 7
If the law or the regulation fails to advance a legitimate state interest,
the Supreme Court will likely determine that a taking exists."8 Although
the Court has never explicitly defined what constitutes a "legitimate state
interest," language has been extended that can serve as a guideline. 9
Even if there are some alternative uses for the land, a land-owner may
still have a takings claim. If the owner of property has invested time and
money into the land, that owner may have an "investment backed expec-
tation" argument against the government regulation.5° The Supreme
Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co."' held that a valid takings claim
44. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 257.
45. Id. at 262-63.
46. Id.
47. Klock & Cook, supra note 8, at 346.
48. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). For an in-depth discussion of
this case, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (that power
required to be exercised in order to effectually discharge within the scope of the constitu-
tional limitations [a state's] paramount obligation to promote and protect the public
health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people). Id. at 387. General
welfare has been construed in many different ways to justify regulations. See, e.g.,
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30-32 (1954) (spiritual and spacial relationships); Save-
land Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 265, 69 N.W.2d 217, 220 (preserve
property values), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955); Warren v. Municipal Officers, 431
A.2d 624, 627 (Me. 1981) (ordinance was a legitimate state interest because it was related
to general welfare).
50. This theory has been defined as, "showing that [appellants] have been denied the
ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for
development is quite simply untenable." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 130 reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
51. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Monsanto had
a property right in its data developed by the company. That data was turned over to the
EPA pursuant to regulations which mandated that all pesticides must be registered with
EPA prior to sale. The EPA disclosed the data. Monsanto argued that the public disclo-
sure of data products on which considerable time and money had been expended consti-
tuted a taking of property. Part of the claim was dismissed because the submission of
data was held to be voluntary (in order to gain a benefit), and because notice was given
that data submitted after 1978 may be disclosed. The Court found, however, that a valid
takings claim existed during the period between 1972 and 1978 because the government
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may be made if a property owner who has invested time and money is
subsequently denied use of the land or is required to conduct extensive
mitigation to compensate for the loss of the expected return.52
By utilizing the Monsanto decision, the requirements for a takings
claim were further delineated in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.53 The Court noted that the right to build on one's own property is
not a benefit bestowed by the government but rather is one of the rights
inherent in land ownership. Thus, the voluntary exchange found in
Monsanto, is not applicable in the Nollan case.54 The Court stated, "[s]o
long as the commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the
easement without compensating them, the prior owners must be under-
stood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the
lot."55 Thus, the full property rights of an owner of property do not
diminish simply because the current owner is not the original purchaser
of the land. In a wetlands takings context, this becomes important be-
cause the fact that an individual is a secondary owner does not diminish
their rights if a takings claim is set forward.
Since challenges to the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers have
failed,56 an owner of wetlands may try to make a takings claim against
the government. The theory of investment backed expectation lends sup-
port to the notion that a property owner who is denied a wetlands fill
permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, may have a valid tak-
ings claim on that basis.57 For example, if a prior owner had the right to
a permit, a subsequent owner who obtains the property with the expecta-
tion of obtaining such a permit may be able to collect compensation. The
Nollan decision supports this idea.5" Thus, the conveyance of a wetlands
parcel from one private owner to another will not itself allow the Corps
to deny a fill permit to the new owner.
Under the takings doctrine which the judiciary currently utilizes, the
United States government must refrain from permit denial or be required
to pay a substantial amount of money in compensation to wetlands own-
has explicitly guaranteed confidentiality during that time. Thus the disclosure of infor-
mation in that time frame without just compensation constituted a taking. Id. at 1016.
52. Id.
53. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The California Coastal Commission granted a permit to
appellants in this case, for a new house on the condition that they allow a public easement
through their beach in order to get to the public beach. The Court ruled that the imposi-
tion by the Commission could not be treated as an exercise of land use regulation since
the purpose of the condition is not related to the permit requirement. The state could not
compel coastal residents alone to contribute to the goal of achieving public benefit
through the allowance of access to the beach without paying just compensation. Id. at
838-42.
54. Id. at 833 n.2.
55. Id.
56. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
57. Klock & Cook, supra note 8 at 354.
58. Id.
1991] WETLANDS REGULATION
ers. 9 The recent "takings trilogy" cases6° demonstrate that the Court is
no longer utilizing restraint in takings cases and is limiting the govern-
ment's police power.6' The trend in the courts of generally validating
claims for takings threatens the traditional use of police power.62 With-
out the inclusion of an environmental perspective in the judicial system,
the continued loss of wetlands in the United States remains a serious
threat.
III. INCLUSION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC
The basic premise behind an environmental ethic is that all land is not
the same, and therefore, cannot be treated in the same way.63 There are
three basic goals of an environmental ethic: (1) to maintain particularly
ecologically sensitive lands; (2) to preserve the legislative intent to main-
tain these lands; and (3) to protect the public's right to an environmen-
tally sound earth.6 The fundamental difference between this ethic and a
purely economic determination is that the land value is determined by
more than a profit analysis. Using an environmental approach, the eco-
logical value of the land is included in the decision of the court to deter-
mine whether compensation must be paid. Failure to incorporate
information concerning the ecology of the land means an important attri-
bute of the land and the role that it plays in our society will not be taken
into account.65
59. Id. at 355. As the risk of costs grow, regulatory bodies may become unwilling to
enact a regulation and risk the financial burden that may be imposed upon them if a
taking is found. See Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River
Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 203-04 (1984).
60. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (In a dispute
over an ordinance that prohibited construction in a flood area, the Court ruled that the
church which owned the property had a valid taking claim. The decision allowed a
claimant to recover damages even for a temporary taking.); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (the Court upheld a statute that required
mining companies to leave in the ground an amount of coal necessary to provide ade-
quate support for various surface activities). This trilogy of cases all decided in 1987,
signified the Supreme Court's more active role in deciding land use cases.
61. It has been noted, "It]he Rehnquist Court's recent series of cases represent a de-
parture from the United States Supreme Court's long-standing position of restraint in
takings cases." Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amend-
ment and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 847, 848 (1989).
62. Id. at 847.
63. See Hunter, supra note 32, at 312. For example, if the land in question is wet-
lands, there are far more ecological concerns than if it were a parking lot. As such, the
courts would be circumventing the very reason that Congress established wetlands pro-
tection legislation.
64. Id. at 313.
65. As one commentator wrote:
The problem with viewing regulatory takings problems in economic terms is
that the language of economics does not adequately embrace the land's ecologi-
cal role. Discussions of dollars and development leave little room to consider
biological pyramids and ecological integrity. In sum, an economic view of land
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It has been noted that the economic approach to the takings clause
embodied in the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution has
created a major obstacle to "effective environmental land-use regula-
tion.",66 The question is to what extent courts should adopt an ecological
perspective. There must exist a proper balance between legitimate prop-
erty rights and concern for the environment. Before this balance can be
analyzed, it is important to determine what is meant by an environmental
ethic. The principles behind an environmental perspective stem from the
premise that all living things exist in interrelated systems. Therefore,
nothing can be viewed in isolation. 67 The inclusion of an environmental
ethic expands the usual economic considerations of the court.6' The en-
vironmental ethic recognizes public rights in ecologically important
lands. 69
It is not unheard of for courts to look at factors beyond financial con-
cerns. 70 In a zoning context, the Supreme Court requires the governing
entity to (1) demonstrate that the land use ordinance has some basis in
health, safety, morals, or general welfare;71 (2) decide what constitutes a
valid assumption of power only after considering the circumstances.72
Decisions by the Supreme Court have extended the concept of "general
welfare" beyond its plain meaning.73 In a wetlands context, therefore, a
fails to value, and thus to protect, the land's function as the base of the ecologi-
cal pyramid on which human beings depend.
Hunter, supra note 32, at 336.
66. Comment, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1620
(1978).
67. See, e.g., W. Berry, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE & AGRICULTURE
22 (1977); Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Sum-
mary, 16 INQUIRY 95 (1973).
68. Hunter, supra note 32, at 336.
69. In some states, the adoption of the "public trust doctrine" has allowed the state
government to avoid a takings claim concerning a land use restriction. The basic theory
behind the doctrine is that a transfer of property is still subject to the public's interest in
its natural resources. Thus, property may be privately owned, however owners would not
be free to do as they pleased with the land. The government would be empowered to
protect the public's interest in the resources by prohibiting certain actions by an owner.
For example, a government prohibition on the filling of wetlands could be sustained
under this doctrine if the government demonstrated that the restriction was for the pro-
tection of the drinking water depended on by the community. For an extensive discus-
sion of the public trust doctrine, see generally, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); McCurdy,
supra note 14.
70. See infra notes 99-102.
71. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)
(police power is that power required to be exercised to effectually discharge a state's
obligation to uphold public health, safety and welfare); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v.
Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82 (1946) (the Court upheld certain portions of New York's multiple
dwelling law because it promoted safety).
72. "The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assump-
tion of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and
conditions." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
73. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (Legislators could consider
aesthetic values as a consideration in the establishment of regulations. Courts have used
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court could find that environmental concerns are included in the general
welfare category. The inclusion of an environmental ethic would simply
allow the judiciary to look to factors beyond an owner's loss and to deter-
mine the impact to ecologically sensitive land when determining whether
a regulation was a valid exercise of police power or if compensation was
constitutionally required.
While it is possible, the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly used
environmental concerns as a standard for finding a taking of an environ-
mentally important area. The lower federal courts and the state courts,
however, have not been quite as reticent.74
The establishment of a workable environmental ethic in the wetlands
takings arena may get some help from the doctrines used in other types
of wetlands litigation. For example, in cases where the plaintiffs are not
the owners of property, but challenge the issuance of permits, courts
have used an ecological standard to make their determinations."
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,76 the district court listed factors that were
considered vital to the establishment of an adequate environmental im-
pact statement.77 Included were a detailed statement'as to "all possible
significant effects on the environment and a sincere discussion of alterna-
tives which may reduce or avoid some or all adverse effects."'7' Although
the injunction in this case was ultimately vacated, the reasoning of the
district court was not questioned.79
The use of this standard demonstrates that courts seriously consider
environmental concerns in other aspects of wetlands litigation. 0 In Si-
erra Club v. Sigler,"' the court stated that, "[a]ll factors which may be
this dictum to uphold zoning regulations based solely on aesthetic values.); Penn Central
Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (The Court
found a land use restriction proper because its purpose was to preserve natural
landmarks. Although economic value of the land was greatly diminished by the regula-
tion set forth by the city, the Court did not find it to constitute a taking.).
74. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
76. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499
F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974), in. vacated, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.
1987). In this case an environmental group brought suit to enjoin construction on a lake
project in Texas. The plaintiffs argued that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
was inadequate. The district court agreed and issued the injunction. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit found the EIS to be adequate but left the injunction in place pending the prepara-
tion of a supplemental statement. Thereafter, the Corps redrafted the project signifi-
cantly and issued an entirely new EIS. The Fifth Circuit then vacated the injunction.
77. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. at 1382-84.
78. Id. at 1342 (quoting Corps Reg. § lib, 37 Fed. Reg. 2525 (1972)).
79. It was after the Corps submitted a new EIS statement for the modified project
that the injunction was vacated. For a discussion of the case, see supra note 76.
80. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). In this case, the court
determined that the EIS was not adequate to allow the issuance of a permit. The court
held that the failure of the Corps to offer an analysis of the results of an oil spill on the
wildlife habitats that existed in the harbor was inconsistent with the legislative mandate
that the Corps examine all reasonable effects of issuing a dredge and fill permit.
81. Id.
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relevant to the proposal must be considered." 2 This decision supports a
court considering factors beyond economic ramifications when it deter-
mines the validity of a land use regulation.
Generally though, the deciding factor of a takings claim, even those
involving wetlands, is economics.83 Although in some cases a court may
find a regulation valid thus denying the takings claim, this is decided
without any consideration of environmental concerns.84 Circuit courts,
however, at times have utilized environmental concerns when making a
determination on a takings claim under section 404.85
As early as 1970, the Fifth Circuit expressed the importance of factor-
ing in environmental impact when determining a taking under federal
regulatory statutes.8 6 In Zabel v. Tabb, the Corps denied a permit under
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.87 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's restrictive view of the Corps' power to deny permits
only to uses that interfered with navigation, flood control, or the produc-
tion of power.88 The Fifth Circuit stated that, "nothing in the statutory
structure compel[s] the Secretary to close his eyes to all that others see.
... The [government] was entitled, if not required to consider ecological
factors . ".8.."9 In making its ruling, the court looked to the congres-
sional intent of enacting protective legislation to preserve the ecology.90
In Zabel, a takings claim was raised but denied by the court, which
stated, "the waters and underlying land are subject to the paramount
servitude" of the federal government. 91 This underlies the difference be-
tween the economic and environmental approach. Under a purely eco-
nomic analysis, factors such as the importance of the ecology would not
be considered. Instead, the court would focus solely on the lost profits
claimed by the owner.
In 1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court became one of the first courts
to utilize an environmental ethic. The court in Just v. Marinette
County,9 2 the court viewed the case as a "conflict between the public
interest in stopping the despoliation of natural resources, which our citi-
82. Id. at 982.
83. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied 455
U.S. 1017 (1982) (a taking can be established if the regulation in question extinguishes all
economic value from the land).
84. Id. at 1192. While the court noted that there was a loss of value in expectation for
the land in question, the claim was denied because the present value of underdeveloped
areas exempt from permits was twice the purchase price of the entire tract.
85. Comment, Wetlands Litigation in the Gulf Coast States, 58 Miss. L.J. 123, 153
(1988).
86. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
87. Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 401-13 (Supp. 1986)).
88. Zabel, 430 F.2d at 201.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 213.
91. Id. at 215.
92. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201'N.W.2d 761 (1972). In this case the owners bought a parcel of
land that was defined as wetlands. Six years later, Wisconsin passed an ordinance that
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zens until recently have taken as inevitable and for granted" and the
owner's claim that they have a right to be compensated for the lost pro-
ductivity of the land.93 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined
that the natural character of the land must be considered when making a
takings determination.94 The decision represented a remarkable break
from the traditional economic theory employed. Instead of focusing
solely on the question of lost profits for the owner of the land, the court
factored into the analysis concern for the ecological value of the land and
the public's right to a healthy ecology.
Much attention focused on the Just decision as a new approach to
viewing land use regulation.95 While there can be no doubt that the Just
case represents an important move toward an environmental ethic, the
court's attempt to reconcile the decision with the more traditional tak-
ings doctrines effectively obscures the meaning of the decision in environ-
mental terms.96 Rather than establish a new ethic, the court used the
same economic standard that other courts chose. The difference between
the tests are the factors the Just court decided to include. The case, how-
ever, has been useful to other courts as a starting point in establishing an
environmental ethic.97
The decision in Sibson v. State of New Hampshire9 represents the be-
ginning of a strong natural use doctrine. In that case, the court denied
the takings claim raised by the plaintiff, basing its decision upon a land
ethic.99 Although the court may have been able to utilize an economic
required a permit for general development. Without seeking such a permit, the owners
began filling wetlands in violation of the statute.
93. Id. at 14-15, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
94. "The exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable and we think it is
not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting
the use of private property to its natural uses." Id. at 17, N.W.2d at 768.
95. See, e.g., Savage and Sierchio, The Adirondack Park Agency Act: A Regional
Land Use Plan Confronts "The Taking Issue, " 40 ALB. L. REV. 447, 475-76 (1976); Com-
ment, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1620-21 (1978).
96. The Justs argue their property has been severely depreciated in value. This depre-
ciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its natural state, but on what the
land would be worth if it could be filled and used for the location of a dwelling. While
loss of value is to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a constructive
taking, value based upon changing the character of the land at the expense of harm to
public rights is not an essential factor or controlling. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 23, 201 N.W.2d
at 771. This justification premised upon the old takings theories led some commentators
to conclude that the practical effect of the case is nil. See,. e.g., Bryden, A Phantom Doc-
trine: The Origins and Effects of Just v. Marinette County, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
397.
97. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So.2d 1374,. 1382, cert. denied sub
nom., Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 281 S.C. 201, 205, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1984); Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands
Bd., 125 N.H. 745, 750, 485 A.2d 287, 290 (1984).
98. 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975), rev'don other grounds sub nom., Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
99. The plaintiffs had purchased six acres of salt marsh and built on part of it. They
sought to fill the remaining acres later but an amendment to the New Hampshire statute
required that a permit be obtained before further filling would be legal. The plaintiff
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approach," ° it chose instead to apply weight to the ecological aspects of
the land. 101 The court held that the denial of a building permit was "not
an appropriation of the property to a public use, but the restraint of an
injurious private use,"10 2 thus applying weight to the ecological aspects
of the land.
The decision attempted to harmonize the many aspects of taking law
into one holistic standard.103 The court's analysis was summed up with a
reference to the Just decision. It stated that "[a]n owner of land has no
absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of
his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its
natural state and which injures the rights of others."" In this way the
court viewed the takings analysis as more than just a private dispute be-
tween an owner of land and the government, but also recognized the far
reaching effect that the dispute had on the general population. The court
recognized the right held by the community to be free from ecological
damage. Thus, Sibson represents an attempt by at least one court to util-
ize all relevant factors concerning the land and not to rely solely on eco-
nomic factors at the exclusion of all others.
Recent cases indicate that, despite an initial withdrawal, support exists
for the standard articulated in Sibson.105 For example, in State of New
Hampshire Wetlands Board v. Marshall,1" the court affirmed the ideas
set forth in Sibson and made a clear distinction between general land use
argued that the unfilled portion of the land was without value and thus a takings claim
existed. Id. at 126, 336 A.2d at 240-241.
100. Some cases have upheld permit denials when the restricted wetlands are only part
of the entire parcel. See, e.g., Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). Using this rationale, the New Hampshire court could have
reached the same conclusion, reasoning that the plaintiffs received a reasonable return on
their investments because they sold the two acres that had been filled. The court did not
do this: instead, it focused on the four unfilled acres in question.
101. Sibson, 115 N.H. at 127-28, 336 A.2d at 241-42.
102. Id. at 128, 336 A.2d at 242, quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush)
53, 85-86 (1851).
103. The court wrote:
Moreover the rights of the plaintiffs in this case do not have the substantive
character of a current use. The denial of the permit by the board did not depre-
ciate the value of the marshlands or cause it to become of practically no pecuni-
ary value. Its value was the same after the denial of the permit as before and it
remained as it had been for millenniums. The referee correctly found that the
action of the board denied plaintiffs none of the normal traditional uses of the
marshland including wildlife observation, hunting, haying of marshgrass, clam
and shellfish harvesting, and aesthetic purposes. The board has not denied
plaintiffs' current uses of their marsh but prevented a major change in the
marsh that plaintiffs seek to make for speculative profit.
Id. at 129, 336 A.2d at 243.
104. Id. (quoting Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(1972)).
105. Initially courts rejected the environmental ethic in takings claims. See, e.g., Bur-
rows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
106. 127 N.H. 240, 500 A.2d 685 (1981).
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regulations and those involving wetlands."°7 Included in the opinion was
a recognition that many rights are involved when discussing the destruc-
tion of wetlands. The court wrote, "[iun Sibson, we recognized the envi-
ronmental uniqueness of wetlands and its importance to the public health
and welfare. Unlike many other property regulation situations, the filling
of wetlands alters the property itself and changes its basic character, to
the detriment of the public good."' '
Following suit with the Just decision, the question for the Supreme
Court, if it decides to rule on the issue, is not what standard should be
applied, but rather, whether an environmental standard should be used.
The traditional view dictates that property should be viewed in purely
economic terms.109 There are strong arguments, however, in favor of
using other factors. Wetlands preservation has become a major priority
of Congress over the last twenty years.'l W In addition, the Supreme
Court itself has deviated from a pure economic analysis in cases concern-
ing zoning restrictions dealing with general welfare,"' societal disap-
proval, 2 historical landmarks," 3 and even the amorphous concept of
aesthetics.' "4 In fact, some of the aesthetics theories that have been used
to uphold land use regulations are far more controversial than environ-
mental concerns." 15
The use of the economic standard by the courts in determining takings
claims is by far the norm, but it is not absolute. When other factors are
weighed, such as, the legislative intent behind the CWA, 6 deviations by
the Supreme Court from the economic theory," 7 and decisions from the
107. Id. at 247-48, 500 A.2d at 689.
108. Id. Recognition of the special nature of wetlands is not unique to the New Hamp-
shire court, nor is it a brand new concept to the judiciary. See Candlestick Properties,
Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1970). This case involved a restriction that left land owners with wetlands of
no economic value. The court carefully distinguished this situation by pointing out that
the legislature, in establishing the restrictions sought to specifically preserve the existing
character of the bay. It is interesting to note that the legislative intent mentioned in
Candlestick Properties is very similar to the intent of Congress in establishing CWA sec-
tion 404. Thus, the adoption by the federal courts of a land-use ethic concerning wet-
lands would not be a wholly new endeavor.
109. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
110. See Tripp & Hertz, supra note 5, at 222.
111. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
112. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (breweries could not be built near cities);
Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition against cement companies
near cities).
113. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 883 (1978).
114. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
115. See, e.g., Note, You Can't Build That Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic
Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013 (1990) (an attack on land
use restrictions that are based solely upon aesthetics). If government will deviate on this
issue, it makes sense to consider the extremely important issue of the environmental pro-
tection. See supra notes 12-14.
116. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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Court stating that even when the economic approach is being used it is
not absolute,' the use of an environmental ethic can be seen as proper.
Strict adherence to an economic theory when dealing with environmen-
tally sensitive land undercuts the very essence of ecological protection
intended by Congress when passing the Clean Water Act." 9
Although under an ecological theory all land is connected to the
ecosystem, not all lands would be exempt from development under an
ecological ethic.' 2 ° Nor would the establishment of an environmental
ethic necessarily increase the burden on the courts. Only in cases where
it was determined that the land in question is ecologically sensitive would
the court go beyond an economic analysis and add in the factor of eco-
logical effects to the land.12
In fact, an additional benefit beyond conserving natural resources
would be created. That benefit would be a greater consistency in takings
litigation concerning ecologically important land. It has been noted that
takings law is very inconsistent, even using the economic theory by it-
self.' 22 The use of an environmental ethic will bring an element of con-
sistency to takings law since "[d]ecisions in individual cases will be more
predictable, because factual determinations will turn on objective scien-
tific data."'' 23
In sum, the inclusion of an environmental ethic in takings law makes
sense when the denial of a permit prevents the filling of land which would
have caused "irreparable damage to an already dangerously diminished
and irreplaceable natural asset."' 24 The economic theory which most
courts apply to takings cases fails to recognize other factors that may be
relevant to the proceedings. Ignoring important valid concerns about the
environment articulated by Congress serves no valid purpose.
118. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (the Court uses economics
as one factor to be used in making land use determinations).
119. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
120. Lands that are not considered to be ecologically sound would not receive
special treatment under a natural use theory. Similarly, lands that are deter-
mined to be ecologically important . . . could be developed if development
would not destroy their ecological function. Only when denial of a permit is
based on the state's legitimate regulatory interest in protecting the ecological
role of the land would a takings claim fail.
Hunter, supra note 32 at 358-59.
121. See id. at 359.
122. Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurispru-
dence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 433, 434 (1988).
123. Hunter, supra note 32, at 359. The question is whether such data is available.
For purposes of identifying ecologically critical wetlands, the federal government pub-
lishes manuals specifically intended to define the different types of wetlands in the United
States. See FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL
WETLANDS, supra note 2.
124. Sibson v. State of New Hampshire, 115 N.H. 124, 126, 336 A.2d at 239, 240
(1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432
A.2d 15 (1984).
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CONCLUSION
The Lorax did leave one word of advice to those interested in avoiding
an environmental disaster. That word was unless. There is no dispute
that we are rapidly depleting our wetlands. The current judicial position
is to ignore concerns beyond pure economics. In doing so, the courts are
making it increasingly difficult for the government to preserve the wet-
lands of this country. Adopting an environmental ethic would allow the
court to give deference to the legislative decisions designed to protect
sensitive environmental lands. By relying on a solely economic approach
the judiciary is continuing to make decisions that have a been based upon
a short term analysis but which have a long term effect. There is evi-
dence that when the outside concerns are great enough the court system
will carve out an exception to the economic rule. The peril faced by the
wetlands in today's society is a great enough concern.
Unless the judiciary becomes willing to include an environmental ethic
in takings determinations, the ecological concerns of the Congress and
the public will go unheeded. We will expose our world to further de-
struction of wetlands. If this is allowed, ecological devastation will not
be limited to the make-believe world of Dr. Seuss.
Alan S. Rafterman
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